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Abstract 
We set up a trade model where three countries compete for an exogenous 
number of firms. Our innovation lies in the geography of the model. Of the three 
countries, one is the hub through which all trade takes place. First, we establish 
the natural geography of the region, which is given by the equilibrium 
distribution of industrial activity in the absence of taxes or subsidies. We then 
examine the implications for corporate taxes when the countries compete with 
each other to attract firms. We find that, even when all countries are the same 
size, the centrality of the hub gives it an advantage in tax setting, such that its 
equilibrium tax can be larger than that of the spokes and yet it still attracts a 
disproportionate share of industry. Thus geographic advantage in tax 
competition has a second dimension, centrality in addition to size.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines international tax competition to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
a regional model with trade costs between countries. Our innovation lies in the geography of 
the region. If there are only two countries in a region, international trade would take place 
across the common frontier of the countries.1 If there are three countries or more, past work 
(e.g., Haufler and Wooton, 2006) has assumed that each country pair shares a frontier and trade 
between the nations takes place across this line. But this excludes the possibility that, in regions 
composed of three or more nations, the most direct or cheapest route for goods traded between 
two nations might be through the territory of a third. Thus a 3-country region may be composed 
of one hub country and two spoke nations, where each spoke accesses the market of the other 
spoke by shipping its products through the hub. Clearly, this implies an asymmetry in 
international transport costs, favouring the centrally placed hub.2 We wish to investigate how 
the adoption of this hub-and-spoke geography affects the established results for the outcome 
of tax competition for FDI. 
This research was suggested by the debate regarding increased autonomy for regional 
administrations in the United Kingdom. There are strong political pressures to devolve 
corporate tax-setting powers to the constituent regions of the UK and, given the geography of 
the country, this raises questions as to how such fiscal independence might affect the level and 
geographic distribution of economic activity and impact on the welfare of the citizens of the 
regions.3 Thus the “hub and spoke” geographic structure we have adopted is an attempt to 
                                                 
1 Of course, the countries may be islands in which case a body of water separates them but there is still a common 
frontier to be crossed at some cost. 
2 Previous work on tax competition with three countries assumed a “triangular” geography, where the countries 
were the corners of a triangle and each country traded directly with the other two. Our innovation is the hub-and-
spoke geography: implicitly, we are assuming that the direct trade cost between the two spokes exceeds the cost 
of shipping through the hub. 
3 The Scottish Government argues “that a unified UK rate of corporate tax is neither desirable nor economically 
efficient. (…) Given the competitive advantages of London relative to other parts of the UK (such as London’s 
position as one of the largest financial centres in the world, and its transport links with major cities worldwide 
etc.) there is clear evidence that London (and indeed the South East of England) already has an in-built competitive 
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reflect the economic and spatial relationships within the UK and between it and the wider 
European market. However, despite the genesis of our modelling endeavour, the analysis is 
readily applicable to any situations where trade costs between countries are not symmetric. For 
example, North America is an obvious case of hub-and-spoke geography The USA is the hub 
nation that both trades with each of two spokes of Canada and Mexico and is also the conduit 
for trade between the spokes. 
At the centre of our analysis are the attempts by governments to attract inward FDI. 
FDI results in increased local production and employment and we assume that this local 
production of the good yields higher social benefits than imports. This reflects what seems to 
be a widely-held government view. There are many possible reasons why, independently of 
capital income and tax/subsidy payments, host countries may favour local production. In the 
analysis in this paper, trade between any two countries is costly. As a result, the market price 
is lower (and consumer surplus higher) when goods are locally produced as compared to being 
imported from another country in the region. Benevolent governments will recognise this and 
seek to attract FDI.4  
Our starting point is the two-country model of Haufler and Wooton (2010) in which 
two nations compete to attract firms from an oligopolistic industry. In models of this type, the 
existence of international trade costs confers an advantage on the larger country in the 
competition for firms, as a large country offers a big domestic market that can be served without 
trade costs. Thus size matters. We increase the number of countries to three and allow for 
different configurations of the population across the region.  
                                                 
advantage over not only Scotland but also other parts of the UK. Scotland needs the lever of corporate tax to 
consider a wider array of options than is currently the case to help address this imbalance.” Scottish Government 
(2011), p34. 
4 Beyond this motivation, there may be labour market benefits from inward FDI. MNEs may offer wage premia 
above workers’ outside options, a polar case of which occurs when inward FDI relieves involuntary 
unemployment (Haaparanta, 1996 and Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006). Alternatively, inward FDI may be associated 
with localised technological spillovers to indigenous firms (Fumagalli, 2003 and Olsen and Osmundsen, 2003). 
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What further distinguishes the current analysis is our assumption that one of the three 
countries occupies a central point geographically, such that all traded goods must pass across 
its frontiers at least once. This hub country can trade directly with each of the other two nations 
but, in contrast, firms located in either spoke country can only access the consumers of the 
other peripheral spoke country by shipping their goods through the core.5 As shipping goods 
across national frontiers is assumed to be costly, firms located in the spokes are at a 
disadvantage in serving their markets, as compared to those firms located in the hub. 
Consequently, we are adding centrality, in addition to size, as a determinant of national 
geographic advantage in the region.  
There are alternative interpretations or applications of the model that might shine some 
light on current policy questions. One is that the model represents a single country whose 
geography means that trade between some provinces is more expensive than others. Thus it 
could represent industrial activity in a country such as the UK, where trade between Scotland 
and Wales must take place through much-larger England. The model could then be used to 
analyse the potential for the two relatively disadvantaged provinces to use devolved corporate 
tax-setting powers to offset their geographic disadvantages. Another modelling possibility 
would be to consider a two-country setting where one of the countries has two centres of 
economic activity that are physically distant from one another. This might characterise trade 
within the UK (between Scotland and England) and with the European market. The implication 
of this is that movement of goods between nodes within this “bicentric” country will also be 
costly and the location of firms within a country, as well as their number, will play a role. If 
one of this country’s nodes (England) is closer to the foreign market, this will be the hub 
through which all exports and imports pass. The other node (Scotland) is therefore 
                                                 
5 Haufler and Wooton (2006) have a 3-country, single-firm model of tax competition in a regional setting where 
the focus is on the implications of tax harmonisation between two of the nations. In our companion paper, Darby, 
Ferrett and Wooton (2012), we examine the outcome of tax competition between m heterogeneous countries but 
without a hub-and-spoke trading pattern. 
 4 
geographically disadvantaged, both by its smaller size and peripheral location, in its chances 
of attracting the FDI of firms aiming to service consumers across the entire region. This has 
the potential to create a tension between citizens resident in one node relative to those in the 
other and may lead to calls for different rates of corporate taxation of firms in order to offset 
the locational disadvantages of one centre relative to the other.6 
Our analysis develops as follows. In section 2 we present the basic hub-and-spoke 
model and examine the geographic distribution of firms in the absence of any corporate tax 
competition. We then consider the incentives facing a single country to use a lower tax (or 
subsidy) to attract additional firms in section 3. Section 4 extends the analysis to consider the 
non-cooperative tax equilibrium in the region where symmetry is imposed on the model, in that 
both spokes are assumed to be of the same size and have the same trade costs with the hub. 
Section 5 concludes.  
2. The model 
We consider an economic region whose countries compete to attract a fixed number of firms. 
These firms produce a homogeneous good, labelled x, in an oligopolistic industry. A second 
good, the numeraire commodity z, is produced under conditions of perfect competition. The 
numeraire industry, which uses labour as the only input, is freely traded resulting in the 
international equalisation of the wage in that industry as w. Trade costs play an important role 
in the model. It is assumed that z is freely traded while x is subject to trade costs. 
The region is composed of 3 countries, a hub country H, and two spoke countries A and 
B. The internationally immobile population is divided into households, each of which supplies 
labour effort and consumes both of the goods produced in the region. Every household in the 
                                                 
6 It is clear that many of Scotland’s key exports do pass through England to access European markets. For 
example, Scottish Government (2009) reports that oil exports “are piped to England (or via England to Continental 
Europe)” (p46) while “much of the whisky destined for European consumption is transported by road to cross the 
Channel at Dover" (p52), and in the case of fish “significant road freight movement (…) is to the south of England 
before being transported to mainland Europe for distribution around the World”(p55). 
 5 
region supplies a single unit of labour. The countries may differ in size where there are 
nH households in the hub and nA and nB households in spoke country A and B, respectively. The 
population of the region is normalised to unity and so nH + nA + nB = 1. 
The cost of shipping a unit of good x between H and A is σ while the cost between H 
and B is τ. As there is no direct trade route between the two spokes, all shipments of good x 
between these two countries must pass through the hub and, consequently, face a higher cost 
for transhipment of (σ + τ).7 This regional trading situation is illustrated in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Geography of the region 
2.1 Consumers 
Consumers in all countries are assumed to have identical preferences for the goods, given by  
 2 ,
2
  i i i iu x x z  (1) 
where i  {A, B, H}. The residents of the countries earn only wage income, while profit income 
accrues to capital owners who reside outside of the region. Moreover, corporate tax revenue, 
                                                 
7 To keep the analysis relatively simple, we have assumed that there are no economies from long-distance shipping 
and that the cost of trade between the two spokes is the sum of the costs of each hub-to-spoke trade. 
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denoted by Ti, is redistributed as income in a lump-sum fashion equally to the households in 
the respective country. The budget constraint for a representative consumer in country i is then  
    i i i i
i
T
w z p x
n
 (2) 
where pi is the price of good x in country i. Utility maximisation leads to inverse-demand 
curves α – βxi. Aggregating the demand for good x over all consumers yields market demand 
curves, denoted Xi:  
 
( ) i ii n pX   (3) 
2.2 The oligopolistic industry 
There are k firms in the x industry, all of which are based outside the region.8 Each of these 
firms possesses one unit of “knowledge capital” (such as a license or patent) that can be 
profitably employed in the imperfectly competitive industry x. This factor is indispensable for 
the production of good x but is limited in availability such that, at most, k firms can engage in 
production. In addition, each firm faces fixed and identical costs of setting up a production 
facility in any country. These costs are assumed to be sufficiently large to ensure that each firm 
will set up, at most, one production plant in the region. Thus each firm will serve the regional 
market from a single country in the region. Firms are assumed to be identical except with 
respect to the location of their production facilities. Where it locates matters to a firm both 
because of the size of its domestic market and the trade costs associated with its exports to 
consumers in foreign markets. 
Labour is the only variable input in good x production. Each unit of good x requires the 
efforts of γ workers, where γ is chosen so that production of x does not exhaust each country’s 
                                                 
8 Examination of the impact of having some indigenous firms in the industry is left to future research. 
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labour supply. Given this, the marginal cost of production can be defined as ω ≡ γw.9 The cost 
of exporting each unit of output, as detailed above, raises the marginal cost of serving a firm’s 
foreign markets relative to supplying domestic consumers. We are assuming that all of the trade 
costs are “real”, taking the form of, say, transport costs or administrative barriers to the free 
movement of goods between countries; and also that all of the trade costs are non-prohibitive, 
so that every firm serves every product market. There are no (endogenously determined) tariffs 
between the countries, as we assume that the region is a free-trade-area.  
Firms are assumed to behave as Cournot competitors and are able to segment their 
markets, choosing the quantities to sell on each market independently.10 The total operating 
profit of a firm based in each production location is therefore  
 
     
     
     
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              
               
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p x p x p x
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      
     
      
 (4) 
where πi is the pre-tax profit of a firm based in country i and xji represents sales in country j by 
a firm based in country i, j  {A, B, H}. A firm is at a cost disadvantage in an export market as 
the marginal cost of exports is higher than that for domestic sales. Consequently we anticipate 
that an exporter will sell less in a market than its indigenous rival.  
Suppose that of the k firms selling in country i, ki firms are “local” in that they have 
their production facilities in the country, while the remaining (k − ki) firms serve the market 
from other countries within the region. Maximising (4), taking into account demand (3), and 
solving yields the total sales and price of good x in each location: 
                                                 
9 Since the wage w is equalised across the countries, it does not enter the location decision of firms in our model. 
Thus the firms’ choice of location is not driven by labour costs. 
10In equilibrium, firms will receive a lower producer price for their exports than for goods destined for the 
domestic market. The trade structure is simply a generalisation of the “reciprocal dumping” model of Brander and 
Krugman (1983). 
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 (5) 
while sales of firms in each country are: 
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In each country, the consumer price is a rising function of the number of firms located in the 
other countries and serving the market through exports. In other words, whatever the size of 
the industry, having more firms producing locally intensifies domestic competition and drives 
down consumer prices.  
Substituting the prices (5) and quantities (6) into (4) yields the pre-tax profits of firms 
dependent on the location of their production facilities: 
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 (7) 
where Α ≡ α – ω. Notice the symmetry in the profits expressions for A and B, as all of their 
exports must pass through the hub, H.  
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We let ij denote the geographic advantage of country i relative to country j. This is 
defined as the difference between the total variable profits of a firm located in country i and 
those of a firm producing in country j. That is, Γij ≡ πi – πj.  
2.3 Location in the absence of tax competition 
Suppose, initially, that firms face no corporate taxes on their earnings or that all countries 
impose the same tax on firms.11 In either situation, the equilibrium location of firms will be 
characterised by the variable profits of all firms in the region being equalised, that is 
πA = πH = πB. Equating the terms in (7) and solving, reveals the “natural geography” of the 
region, the allocation of industry that is consistent with equal pre-tax profits for all k firms. 
Thus ki* is the equilibrium number of firms that locate in country i in the absence of fiscal 
inducements, where: 
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We can use (8) to investigate the relationship between trade costs and the sizes of 
countries in determining the degree to which industry agglomerates in particular countries. The 
hub country, H, always has the advantage of centrality, in that its aggregate costs of servicing 
its foreign markets are always less than those of the spoke countries, as the hub transports its 
goods directly to consumers in each spoke. This aspect of geographic advantage can be 
enhanced, or offset, by the distribution of the region’s population between hub and spokes. We 
illustrate this in Figure 2. 
  
                                                 
11 The latter situation could arise when the countries in the region cooperate in setting their corporate taxes in 
order to avoid a “race to the bottom.” Equally this could describe a single country prior to the devolution of tax-
setting powers to provincial governments. 
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Figure 2. Natural geography and agglomeration of industry 
The benefit of centrality is clearly shown in Figure 2 along the dotted line, 
corresponding to each country having the same share of the region’s population.12 In this case, 
the number of firms per household in the hub is substantially greater than that in each of the 
two spokes. Country size reinforces centrality to the left of the dotted line where nH rises at the 
expense of the population of spoke A, while B’s population remains unchanged at nB = ⅓. To 
the right of the dotted line, the spokes are allocated greater shares of the region’s population 
than the hub, and size increasingly offsets centrality. While both A and B grow in size relative 
to the hub, the population of A also increases relative to the constant nB and therefore A attracts 
proportionately more industry than B, reflecting the agglomerative nature of this type of model 
of firm location. 
                                                 
12 The parameters for this and subsequent numerical simulations are: k = 100,  = 26,  = 1,  = 1,  =  =0.2. 
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We now consider the role of trade costs in the natural geography of the region. In 
Figure 3 each country is the same size but trade costs are changed. When trade costs between 
the hub and both spokes are the same on the left-hand side of the figure ( = ), the hub’s 
centrality results in its attracting much more industry than either spoke. As the trade cost 
between the hub and spoke A increases, while that between H and B remains unchanged, the 
hub’s access to A’s consumers is reduced. Effectively, A is becoming more isolated from the 
rest of the region and firms that previously located in H and served A’s consumers from that 
location have the incentive to relocate to that spoke.  
Figure 3. Natural geography and asymmetric trade costs 
Of particular interest is what happens in the other spoke. B does not experience any 
change in its direct trade costs (), though its costs of trading with A rise. However, the increase 
in trade costs between H and A has a larger impact on the profitability of firms in the hub (as 
the initial trade volume is higher), resulting in some of the firms relocating to the relatively 
more profitable B. Consequently, both spokes can experience an increase in the concentration 
 12 
of industry despite only one of the trade costs increasing as the centrality of the hub is 
undermined. 
We can use the natural geography of industrial production to determine the levels of 
economic activity in each country. Substituting the equilibrium allocations of industry (8) into 
(5) to find the prices and sales in each of the countries, yields 
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 (9) 
We see from (9) that trade costs impact on both the price in each national market and the 
quantity that is sold there. For a spoke country, its trade cost with the hub has a direct effect, 
but the rival spoke’s trade cost also affects the level of economic activity.  
3. Governments 
Each national government is assumed to have as its goal the maximisation of the welfare of its 
households, where welfare is the sum of the consumer surplus, tax revenue, and wage income.13  
 i i i iW S T n w     (10) 
Si is country i’s total consumer surplus in the market for the imperfectly competitive good, 
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13 We are assuming that all profits from the activities of the imperfectly competitive firm are repatriated to their 
foreign owners. 
 13 
Consumer surplus in each country is rising in the total number of firms in the industry, k, as 
this intensifies competition and reduces producer prices in all countries. High trade costs reduce 
consumer surplus as they lower international competition. In addition, a greater number of 
firms located in other countries reduces consumer surplus, as consumer prices are lower when 
more firms produce locally. This gives each nation an incentive to attract firms to its home 
jurisdiction. 
Ti is the total corporate tax revenue collected by country i,  
 i i iT t k   (12) 
We assume that profits are taxed at source by the host countries of the firms, with ti being the 
lump-sum tax imposed on each firm by country i. The tax differential between countries i and j 
is defined to be ∆ij ≡ ti – tj. Higher taxes expand the budget sets of the nation’s households, but 
will drive away firms to lower tax regimes. 
The third term of national welfare is assumed to be unchanging, as wage income 
remains the same regardless of where workers are employed. We assume that the jobs provided 
by the oligopolistic industry offer the same wage as that in the numeraire industry.14  
3.1 Corporate taxation 
Firms are concerned with their after-tax earnings, thus they must subtract from their pre-tax 
profits (7) the lump-sum tax of the country in which they are located. In deciding upon where 
to invest, firms will compare profits net of taxes and locate in the most profitable location. If 
all countries host a strictly positive number of firms, then the locational equilibrium for the 
industry is characterised by  
 0ij ij    (13) 
for every pairwise combination of investment locations. 
                                                 
14 It is possible to include some sort of wage premium for jobs in the footloose industry. This is likely to create 
the same incentives for attracting firms as consumer surplus, so we do not pursue it in this paper. 
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We can solve for the distribution of firms in the presence of taxes as deviations from 
the natural geography of the region, the allocation of industry in the absence of taxes. Let kit be 
country i’s equilibrium number of firms in the presence of taxes. From (7), (8) and (13), we 
find: 
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 (14) 
It is immediately obvious that only differences in taxes, not the levels of taxes, matter for 
industrial location in the region. If all countries have set the same tax, firm numbers in each 
country are the same as in the absence of any corporate taxes. 
When taxes differ we can see, from the second terms of the equations in (14), that spoke 
countries lose firms as a result of their imposing taxes higher than those set in the hub. The 
impact is mitigated by the (square of the) trade cost between the spoke and the hub. If the trade 
costs  and  are sufficiently similar in size, then the spoke’s loss of firms directly benefits the 
hub.15 In addition, there may also be an increase in firms in the other spoke. Thus, in each of 
the expressions for the number of firms in a spoke country, the third term is positive if the 
population of the hub is at least half of the total population in the region (2nH > 1). This means 
that, if the hub is sufficiently large, a spoke’s tax increase will cause an exodus of firms to both 
the hub and the other spoke.  
                                                 
15 Technically, kHt is increasing in AH (BH) iff  +  is strictly greater than 2nH (2nH). Both conditions hold if 
 = . 
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3.2 Unilateral taxation 
Suppose that the corporate tax is the same across all of the countries. This might reflect the 
situation where the three countries are, in fact, constituent nations of a federal state that sets 
the corporate tax for the entire region. For simplicity, we assume that this initial tax level is 
zero. We now allow for the possibility that these tax powers are devolved to one or more of the 
countries and investigate how its optimal tax might deviate from that of the rest of the region.16 
By differentiating (10), taking into account (11) and (14), we can find the optimal tax 
that would be chosen unilaterally by each of the countries. 
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 (15) 
For each of the spoke countries, the denominators in (15) are positive whenever the hub is not 
overwhelmingly large (that is, nH is sufficiently less than one). For these countries, the size of 
the tax is proportionate to the trade cost with the hub. Whether the tax is positive or negative 
(a subsidy) depends upon the relative sizes of the two terms in the numerator of the second 
term in each of the expressions. The first of these is proportional to the number of firms located 
in the country and reflects the fact that a higher tax increase revenues for the government. The 
second term is directly related to (5), the level of sales in the domestic market: a higher tax 
will drive out some firms, leaving the local market less competitive.17 The denominator of the 
                                                 
16 This can be seen as an extremely stylised approach to the issue of devolving taxation powers within the UK, 
where the competition to attract firms is focused on those enterprises already located within the borders of the 
country but sufficiently footloose that they may be induced to relocate due to a more favourable tax environment. 
17 Thus, when contemplating an increase in corporate taxation, a country typically faces a trade-off between 
(rising) tax revenue and (falling) consumer surplus. Of course, a welfare-maximising government will never raise 
its tax to such a level that the resulting loss of firms leads to a fall in its aggregate tax revenues. 
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second term in the optimal tax of the hub is less easily signed, though the numerator shares 
similar components to those of the other nations’ tax expressions. 
These results are illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the impact of a corporate subsidy 
offered by spoke A on the allocation of firms across the region as the population of the region 
is reallocated internationally. 18  The vertical dashed line reflects an equal distribution of 
workers while the other dashed lines remind us of the distribution of economic activity in the 
absence of corporate taxes or subsidies. A’s subsidy attracts more firms at the expense of H. In 
addition, as nH < ½, spoke A’s subsidy results in spoke B also increasing the number of firms 
that it can attract. 
Figure 4. Unilateral subsidy and industrial location 
It is clear from (15) that the countries have incentives to deviate from the tax levels of 
their trading partners and, indeed, respond to any shifts in taxes that the other countries may 
                                                 
18 AH = −0.01 while BH = 0. 
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make. The task is then to determine what the equilibrium taxes will be in such a strategic 
setting. We therefore turn to finding the Nash taxes. 
4. Symmetry 
In order to examine the relative importance of being at the core of the region as opposed to 
being on the periphery, it will be useful introduce a degree of symmetry across the spoke 
countries. Suppose that the two spokes are identical in size, each having a population of 
nS = (1 – nH)/2, while their costs of transporting goods to and from the hub are the same and 
equal to τ. This configuration of countries is illustrated in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Symmetrical hub and spoke region 
This simplifies the expressions substantially. Thus the number of firms in each country 
in the absence of corporate taxes collapses from (8) to 
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It is apparent from (16) that the hub/spoke trade cost and the relative size of the markets in the 
hub and the spokes determines whether the spokes capture any of the firms in the oligopolistic 
 18 
industry. Each spoke has to have a large-enough home market, which is sufficiently isolated 
from the hub, to make it worthwhile for firms to locate away from the core. Thus, only if 
τ > 2nHΑ⁄(k + 1) will the hubs produce both goods. When corporate taxes are imposed, (14) 
changes to  
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where {ΔSiH, ΔSjH}  {ΔS1H, ΔS2H}, i  j.  
4.1 Optimal taxes 
Suppose that each of the countries now sets a corporate tax to maximise its welfare, conditional 
on the taxes set by the other countries in the region. The reaction functions for the countries 
are 
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(18) 
Solving (18), substituting (16) yields the Nash corporate taxes tSN and tHN for a spoke nation 
and the hub, respectively: 
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    2where 1 8 7 4 1 0.        Hk k k n    
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The tax levels in the Nash equilibrium associated with different distributions of the 
region’s population are illustrated in Figure 6. It is clear that the relatively larger a country is, 
the higher its tax. Thus when the hub is small (e.g., with 25% of the population in the hub 
compared to 37.5% in each spoke), the hub provides a subsidy to its firms while the spokes 
charge taxes. The reverse is true when the spokes have relatively small shares of the population. 
Three additional aspects are worth noting. Firstly the race to the bottom is limited, as there is 
a range of the population allocation over which all countries impose taxes. Secondly, the central 
position of the hub still confers benefits, in that when the countries are equally sized, the hub 
sets a higher tax than either spoke.  
Figure 6. Nash taxes and country size 
Finally, the trade cost has a strong positive impact on the levels of tax in both hub and 
spokes. Thus efforts to reduce trade costs may result in lower corporate taxes and, from (16), 
further concentration of firms in the hub. Consequently, depending upon the impact on 
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consumer surplus, transport infrastructure investments may have a negative impact on the 
region.19 
While messy, the expressions in (19) seem to reflect the tension facing nations between 
generating revenue from high taxes on local firms with the desire to retain domestic industry 
in order to maximise consumer surplus. 20  Figure 7 illustrates how taxes in the Nash 
equilibrium mitigate some of the effects of natural geography. The dashed lines indicate the 
numbers of firms captured by countries as a function of their populations in the absence of tax 
differences. The solid lines show that the distribution of firms across the region is less 
responsive to population changes when countries set their corporate taxes endogenously, 
imposing taxes when locations are attractive to firms (large) and offering subsidies when they 
are geographically disadvantaged (small). 
Figure 7. Nash taxes and location of industry 
                                                 
19 Becker and Fuest (2010) consider the implications for tax competition and welfare of transport infrastructure 
investments in a 3-country model. 
20 If the oligopolistic industry were to bring “better” jobs, this latter incentive to retain domestic firms would be 
reinforced. 
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5. Conclusions and future research 
In this paper we have set up a simple model of intra-regional tax competition for foreign direct 
investment. The novelty in our approach is the geography of the region, where we have 
assumed that one of the nations is a hub through which all international trade must take place. 
We believe that this structure is applicable to trade amongst countries at the periphery of a large 
region. Indeed, the implications of devolving tax-setting powers to sub-national governments 
in the UK generated the initial motivation for this paper. 
In Haufler and Wooton (1999, 2010), size was the only advantage in a tax competition 
game. Now centrality is also an advantage. The former results in larger countries setting higher 
corporate taxes while the latter gives a similar incentive to hub nations. Thus, depending on 
the relative sizes of the countries within the region, the two effects may work together for a 
large hub or centrality may offset the disadvantage of being a small hub. 
If this hub-and-spoke trading structure exists within an individual country (such as the 
UK), we can analyse the implications of that country shifting from setting a single, corporate 
tax on firms operating anywhere in the country to a devolved tax-setting regime where each 
devolved government sets a corporate tax that recognises the different trading conditions facing 
firms investing in its part of the larger nation. Our goal would then be the comparison of the 
equilibria associated with the two regimes, in terms of the impact of devolution on the 
aggregate level of economic activity in the country, how it is divided and the consequent impact 
on the welfare of citizens of each part of the nation. 
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